TO BE PUBLISHED
November 9, 1994
IN RE: The Kentucky Standard/Nelson County Dispatch Center
OPEN RECORDS DECISION
This appeal originated in a request for records submitted by Mr. Steve Lowery, publisher of The Kentucky Standard, to Mr. John David "Jack" Seay, Assistant Nelson County Attorney, on September 15, 1993. Mr. Lowery requested that he be furnished with "unedited copies of police blotters kept by the '911' dispatchers at the Nelson County Dispatch Center." On September 22, Mr. Lowery amended his request, asking that he be afforded access to the "daily logs kept by the Nelson County dispatch center that include all communication--including names--dealing with all law enforcement agencies in Nelson County." Relying on KRS 61.878(1)(a) and (h), now codified and hereinafter referred to as KRS 61.878(1)(a) and (i), Mr. Seay denied both requests.
In his initial response, Mr. Seay noted that the "dispatch log contains requests from citizens seeking police or other emergency assistance by placing a '911' telephone call," and refers "only incidentally," to persons who are arrested. He explained that the Dispatch Center currently releases its "911" dispatch log after redacting the names of callers and any other identifying information. This policy is, in Mr. Seay's view, consistent with OAG 90-117 in which this Office held that "disclosure of a complainant's identity by providing a copy of [a '911'] tape would be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy which is not outweighed by the public's right to governmental information." OAG 90-117, p. 4. Adopting the reasoning of this opinion, Mr. Seay argued that release of these records would have a potential chilling effect on the use of the "911" system by callers who do not want their identities
revealed. Additionally, he noted that OAG 90-117 authorized nondisclosure of the tapes, and by extension, the dispatch log, on the basis of KRS 61.878(1)(i) which exempts "correspondence with private individuals, other than correspondence which is intended to give notice of final action of a public agency[.]"
Elaborating on this position in a subsequent response, Mr. Seay provided a detailed explanation of the Dispatch Center's policy relative to each type of call received over its "911" system. He again expressed the view that notations on the dispatch log reflecting emergency "911" calls were exempt pursuant to KRS 61.878(1)(a) and (i). It was his position that this protection extended to the identities of callers and the identities of the individuals against whom allegations were made. Mr. Seay expressed a similar view on the issue of disclosure of notations reflecting nonemergency calls, maintaining that these notations were also exempt pursuant to KRS 61.878(1)(a) and (i).
Mr. Seay indicated that the dispatchers also record "miscellaneous radio communications between the dispatch center and law enforcement personnel in the field." As an example, he noted that an officer may contact the dispatcher by radio to request an automobile registration check. All "identifying information" recorded on the log which relates to these calls is, in his view, exempt from disclosure pursuant to KRS 61.878(1)(i).
With respect to identifying information appearing on the dispatch log relative to ambulance calls, Mr. Seay stated that the parties were in agreement that "such information is exempt from disclosure," and that it was his understanding that Mr. Lowery therefore did not seek "information concerning identities of persons carried by the ambulance." In light of this understanding, he advised "that regardless of the final outcome of [Mr. Lowery's] other requests, there will be some editing on the logs due to ambulance runs also being included on the logs."
Finally, Mr. Seay denied Mr. Lowery access to names and identifying information relating to fire department runs which appears on the dispatch log. Relying on KRS 61.878(1)(a) and (i), he explained that such information is edited "because of the frequency of false or mistaken calls." Moreover, he observed, a fire run "may be the subject of an arson investigation and thus of a sensitive nature." Based on these
considerations, Mr. Seay could not "justify release of the unedited dispatch log."
On behalf of his clients, The Kentucky Standard and Mr. Lowery, Mr. Jon L. Fleischaker requests that this Office review the Nelson County Dispatch Center's policy relative to the release of its edited dispatch log pursuant to KRS 61.880(2). Mr. Fleischaker maintains that the "blanket editing of records is not support by any of the 'strictly construed' exceptions to the Open Records Law." Although he concedes that on occasion information in a particular entry may be redacted from the records, pursuant to KRS 61.878(4), "when supported by a specific exception," he argues that "communication log entries relating to law enforcement and fire department runs must be released in their original, unedited form." He rejects Mr. Seay's invocation of KRS 61.878(1)(a), the privacy exception, "because, quite simply, there are no privacy interests at stake."
Continuing, Mr. Fleischaker observes:
KRS 61.878(1)(a) allows a public agency to withhold '[p]ublic records containing information of a personal nature where the public disclosure thereof would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.' The identity of an individual who utilizes the services of a public law enforcement or fire protection agency, whether it be to lodge a complaint, report a crime or request assistance, is not 'information of personal nature' [sic] within the meaning of the strictly construed exemption.
Mr. Fleischaker notes that an individual who reports a fire or crime cannot reasonably expect that his or her privacy interests will be protected "when the several screaming, flashing, bright red engines come barreling down his [or her] street in response" or when he or she "must . . . stand in open court and testify fully concerning [the reported crime]."
Moreover, Mr. Fleischaker asserts that as a matter of law "an individual has no right of privacy in matters of public interest." Citing University of Kentucky v. Courier-Journal, Ky., 830 S.W.2d 373, 377 (1992) and OAG 91-131, he argues that when a person placed a 911 call, "he or she necessarily waives
a certain amount of privacy." In addition, he notes that the Kentucky Supreme Court has firmly established that the privacy exception only extends to records which contain information that "touches upon the most intimate and personal features of private lives." Kentucky Board of Examiners of Psychologists v. Courier-Journal, Ky., 826 S.W.2d 324, 328 (1992). Inasmuch as the Dispatch Center has not shown that the unedited logs touch upon the intimate and personal features of private lives, it cannot, in his view, justify blanket nondisclosure of names and identifying information.
Mr. Fleischaker distinguished OAG 90-117, which affirmed a public agency's policy of withholding audio tapes of 911 calls because the tapes would reveal the caller's identity.
Disclosure of the Dispatch Center's written log still leaves open the opportunity for individuals to communicate through the public service without identifying themselves . . . . [T]he sole basis for the Attorney General's Opinion 90-117 was that 'release of the complainant's identity would effectively chill many 911 telephone calls.' This 'chilling' argument in an open records context has since been soundly rejected by the Kentucky Supreme Court as being 'without legal basis.' University of Kentucky, supra at 377-78 n. 2.
Mr. Fleischaker urges this Office to reevaluate the Dispatch Center's policy in light of University of Kentucky v. Courier-Journal, supra, which counsels a narrow interpretation of KRS 61.878(1)(a). "[T]here can be no doubt," he maintains, "that the privacy exemption is applicable only in extreme cases where there is no legitimate public interest involved." Since this argument cannot be made with respect to "911" logs, he takes the position that they must be released.
Mr. Fleischaker argues that Mr. Seay's reliance on KRS 61.878(1)(i), relating to correspondence with private individuals, "is misplaced insofar as it represents a strained construction of the term 'correspondence.'" Citing Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1991), he observes that that term denotes "communication by letters," and that the documents sought by The Kentucky Standard are not letters. Accordingly, that exemption is, in his opinion, inapplicable.
In closing, Mr. Fleischaker reasons:
The Kentucky Open Records [sic] is premised on the policy that free and open access of public records in [sic] the public interest. KRS 61.874. Indeed, one of the purposes of the Act is to allow the public to scrutinize the performance of public agencies and thereby serve as an impetus for an agency to steadfastly pursue the public good. Board of Examiners, supra, at 328. The public has a compelling interest in the how [sic] its police and fire departments respond to citizens' '911' calls and therefore has the right to examine unedited records reflecting these calls. [Footnote omitted.] It further has a right to know who utilizes these public services . . . and how often. This is true even if 'such examination may cause inconvenience or embarrassment to public officials or others.' KRS 61.871.
It is Mr. Fleischaker's position that the public cannot "effectively monitor" the performance of the Nelson County police and fire departments without access to the callers' identities.
We are asked to determine if the Nelson County Dispatch Center properly relied on KRS 61.878(1)(a) and (i) in adopting a policy of blanket nondisclosure relative to names and other identifying information appearing on its dispatch log. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the Center's policy violates the Open Records Law.
In a series of opinions dating back to the enactment of the Open Records Law, this Office has recognized that records of law enforcement agencies are, in general, subject to public inspection unless they are specifically exempted by statute. OAG 76-478. In that opinion, we observed:
Police Departments do not have the authority to act privately, confidentially or secretly unless expressly authorized in particular kinds of cases.
OAG 76-478, at p. 2. We subsequently confirmed this position, noting that "[t]he sovereign is a party to police actions and therefore the public has a right to inspect the records of . . . [its] actions." OAG 76-511, at p. 4.
This principle has been refined over time with respect to various categories of records, including dispatch logs. Although we have recognized that a police department may, on occasion, "feel it necessary to withhold certain items from public inspection in order to protect a police officer or an informant," and that it must, on these occasions, "justify the refusal of inspection with specificity," we have generally ruled that "records of police departments showing complaints received from citizens and other incidences occurring in its daily operation are open to public inspection." OAG 77-102, at p. 2; see also OAG 82-70; OAG 89-20; OAG 89-68; 93-ORD-41. An even stronger statement of this principle is found at page 2 of OAG 80-144, where we held:
[T]he Sheriff's Department is the servant of the people and if a citizen wants the services of the Sheriff's Department to investigate a crime, he cannot expect that the matter will be kept secret. It is our opinion that the Sheriff's Department must allow public inspection of any records pertaining to the reporting of a crime except records which might disclose information which would endanger the life of a police officer or an informant . . . .
We believe that the logic of that opinion can be extended to dispatch logs generally.
In an early analysis of this issue, we observed:
[W]e have never held that any of the items which are included in the dispatch log may be considered as falling under one of the exemptions to mandatory disclosure except we have said that we believe that the identity of persons transported by a public ambulance could be kept confidential out of respect for the privacy rights of the transportees. OAG 76-568. In OAG 76-424 we said that there is no right of privacy as far as
police logs are concerned and that the police blotter or incident report should be open for public inspection. OAG 77-102. We see no reason why the logs of the sheriff's office and the fire department should be confidential.
We would point out that there is a difference between a dispatch log and investigative reports containing evidentiary matter which may be used in a prosecution. Records of law enforcement agencies compiled in the process of detecting and investigating violations of the law may be withheld from public disclosure if they contain information which would harm the agency by revealing the identity of informants not otherwise known or by a premature release of information to be used in a prospective law enforcement action. KRS 61.878(1)[(h)]. Nothing in this provision would justify making an entire police log secret from the public. If any item in the log on a particular date is withheld from public disclosure because revealing the item would be harmful to law enforcement, the custodian has the burden of showing that the item is being properly withheld for that reason.
OAG 82-70, p. 2, 3. We concluded that opinion by noting that Kentucky has no privacy statutes, and that the Open Records Law does not prohibit release of otherwise exempt records. Because the exceptions are permissive, and the custodian of records is not exposed to any penalty if he releases exempt records, a dispatch center must make its log available for inspection in an unedited form, or, if it elects to edit a particular entry, justify that withholding by reference to a specific statutory exception.
In a similar vein, at page 3 of OAG 89-20 we held:
Police dispatch logs are typically seriatim notations, commonly of a summary character, of police dispatches and disposition codes, compiled collaterally to, and not integrally
in the process of, detecting and investigating statutory violations, in contrast to, for example, an investigator's notes. Such logs have never been granted blanket exclusion from inspection by the public in this state. In order to be exempted from inspection pursuant to KRS 61.878(1)[(h)], particulars regarding given notations on a log would have to be articulated in terms of the requirements of the statute.
The Nelson County Dispatch Center has acknowledged these principles in the past by honoring requests to view the dispatch log, albeit in an edited form. The parties are therefore substantially in agreement.
The narrow issue presented in this appeal is whether, as a matter of policy, the Nelson County Dispatch Center can withhold the names of individuals using the "911" service and other identifying information which appears on the dispatch log. We find no support for the Dispatch Center's policy in this jurisdiction.
As noted, this Office has consistently recognized that exclusion of particular entries on a dispatch log must be "articulated in terms of the requirements of the statute." OAG 89-20, p. 3. The focus in our earlier opinions was on the "law enforcement exception" to the Open Records Law, KRS 61.878(1)(h). Mr. Seay focuses on the privacy exception and OAG 90-117. In our view, a generic determination that certain categories of information are excluded from the mandatory disclosure provisions of the Open Records Law under either of these exceptions, or any other exception, does not satisfy the requirements of that law. In reaching this decision, we are guided by several pertinent sections of the law, bearing in mind that the "basic policy of KRS 61.870 to 61.884 is that free and open examination of public records is in the public interest." KRS 61.871. First of all, 61.880(2) mandates that the burden of proof in sustaining a public agency's denial of an open records request rests with the agency. Second, an agency can properly rely on KRS 61.878(1)(a) in withholding a record only if it can establish that the public's interest in release of that record is outweighed by the individual's privacy interest. Finally, KRS 61.878(4) makes explicit the requirement of particularized justification by providing, "If any public record contains material which is not excepted under
[KRS 61.878], the public agency shall separate the excepted and make the nonexcepted material available for examination."
Among the documents which may be excluded from the mandatory disclosure provisions of the Open Records Law are:
Public records containing information of a personal nature where the public disclosure thereof would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
KRS 61.878(1)(a). In Kentucky Board of Examiners of Psychologists v. the Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co., Ky., 826 S.W.2d 324 (1992), the Kentucky Supreme Court analyzed this exception at length. Acknowledging that the Open Records Law "exhibits a general bias favoring disclosure," Kentucky Board of Examiners, supra at 327, the Court formulated a balancing test to be used in assessing the propriety of an agency's invocation of the privacy exception. The Court reasoned:
[G]iven the privacy interest on the one hand and, on the other, the general rule of inspection and its underlying policy of openness for the public good, there is but one available mode of decision, and that is by comparative weighing of the antagonistic interests. Necessarily, the circumstances of a particular case will affect the balance. The statute contemplates a case-specific approach by providing for de novo judicial review of agency actions, and by requiring that the agency sustain its action by proof. Moreover, the question of whether an invasion of privacy is 'clearly unwarranted' is intrinsically situational, and can only be determined within a specific context.
Kentucky Board of Examiners, supra at 327, 328. Fundamental to this "comparative weighing of antagonistic interests" is the recognition that "the policy of disclosure is purposed to subserve the public interest, not to satisfy the public's curiosity." Kentucky Board of Examiners, supra at 328.
The Supreme Court characterized these "antagonistic interests" as the public's interest in knowing whether its agencies are properly executing their statutory functions and its public servants are serving the public, and the individual's interest in the nondisclosure of records that touch upon the intimate or personal features of his or her life. The fundamental purpose of the Nelson County Dispatch Center is to ensure public safety and welfare by providing effective law enforcement and emergency services to persons who reside in Nelson County and who avail themselves of these services by using the "911" system. The Dispatch Center currently releases its log after editing out the names and identifying information of callers and person against whom complaints are made. Mr. Fleischaker argues that the public cannot effectively monitor the performance of the police and fire departments without access to the various callers' identities.
Mr. Seay does not identify, with any degree of specificity, the nature of the privacy interests implicated by release of the dispatch log. He maintains, generally, that release of the unedited log is likely to have a chilling effect on the use of the "911" system. Nor, on the other hand, does Mr. Fleischaker substantiate his position relative to the public interest in monitoring the performance of the police and fire departments. He does not explain how the public's ability to monitor the Dispatch Center's performance will be hindered by the Center's failure to release the callers' identities.
Nevertheless, the competing interests are clear and important. As noted, the public's right to know is premised upon the public's right to expect its agencies to execute their statutory functions. Release of the identities of callers will facilitate the public's ability to monitor the Dispatch Center's performance by enabling the public to ascertain who, if anyone, is misusing or abusing the system by making unreasonable demands on the service, or calling in false reports. Further, release of the caller's identities will enable the public to assess the effectiveness of the services through direct communication with persons who have availed themselves of the services. Finally, release of the caller's identities will enable the public to evaluate whether services are rendered in a uniform matter regardless of the callers' identities.
The countervailing privacy interests are equally identifiable and important. Release of the callers' identities
in conjunction with the details of a particular call may disclose the personal features of the caller's private life.1 Moreover, the caller may have a legitimate desire to avoid disclosure. The law recognizes confidential informants and the right to keep their identities confidential. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 1 L.Ed.2d 639, 77 S.Ct. 623 (1957); KRS 422A.0508 (KRE 508); KRS 61.878(1)(h); KRS 17.150(2)(a). Thus, an argument can be made that requiring disclosure of the identities of individuals who furnish information of violations of law to law enforcement agencies may hinder effective law enforcement.2 In addition, use of the "911" system is frequently precipitated by occurrences resulting in personal tragedy or loss. Callers have a cognizable privacy interest in the nonrelease of their identities to certain predatory types who might exploit these tragedies for personal gain.3
These competing interests are equally compelling. In such instances, and in view of the fact that "[t]he Act's 'basic policy' is to afford free and open examination of public records and all exceptions must be strictly construed," Kentucky Board of Examiners, supra at 327, we are left with no alternative but to find that, as a matter of policy, the Dispatch Center is foreclosed from adopting a policy of blanket exclusion relative to names and identifying information
1In Kentucky Board of Examiners, supra at 328, the Supreme Court held that materials containing "details of . . . marital and familial relationships and psychological symptom . . ." are of a very personal nature ". . . touch[ing] upon the most intimate and personal features of private lives." This suggests the type of information which may be withheld pursuant to KRS 61.878(1)(a) in the absence of a superior public interest in disclosure.
2While we do not believe that the footnote which appears in University of Kentucky v. Courier-Journal, supra at 377, 378, can be construed as an absolute repudiation of the "chilling effect" argument in all contexts and for all purposes, as Mr. Fleischaker argues, we do believe that a generic determination by a public agency that release of names on the dispatch log would have a chilling effect on use of the "911" service does not satisfy that agency's statutory burden of proof to sustain its denial.
3For example, lawyers and other professionals who collect the information to solicit potential clients.
appearing on its log. As we noted at page 3 of OAG 80-54, in holding that a police department could not adopt a policy of withholding the names of rape victims under KRS 17.150(2) and KRS 61.178(1)(h):
We believe that generally the public interest in police business outweighs any privacy interest of victims, offenders or police personnel. We have opined that records of a police department which are referred to as the "police blotter" or "incident reports" are open to public inspection. OAG 77-102. Such records usually contain the name of the complaining victim. The question you present is whether the police may adopt an exception to the general rule in regard to rape victims. We believe that there is no statutory provision for such an exception.
As we have often observed, a newspaper has the same right of access to public records as has the general public. The public has the right to inspect any public record unless it is made confidential by statute or comes under one of the exemptions in KRS 61.878. We believe it is not for the Attorney General to weigh the equities or rationalize exemptions which are not expressly set forth in the law. We interpret the law as it is and not as the way we think it should be. If changes in the law are to be made, they should be made by the legislature and if subtle interpretations are to be made, they should be made by the Court.
It is therefore the opinion of the Attorney General that a police department cannot adopt a policy of withholding the names of victims of crime, including the crime of rape.
See also, 93-ORD-13 (holding that a police department cannot adopt a policy of withholding information relating to rape victims or victims of sex crimes under authority of KRS 61.878(1)(a)).
While it can be argued that release of the edited dispatch log serves the public's interest in ensuring that the police and fire departments are properly discharging their duties, and that the release of the names and identifying information does little more than satisfy the public's curiosity, we believe that other factors militate in favor of disclosure. Individuals may utilize the service without identifying themselves, and their identities will be protected. Alternatively, they can request that their identities not be disclosed. The identities of these individuals could be protected upon a showing that they requested or could reasonably expect confidentiality. In these instances, Mr. Fleischaker acknowledges that information in a particular entry may be redacted from the records pursuant to KRS 61.878(4).
Mr. Seay relies on this Office's opinion in OAG 90-117 in denying Mr. Lowery's request for an unedited copy of the "911" dispatch log. As noted, in that opinion we dealt with the issue of access to audio tapes of "911" calls, holding that "disclosure of the complainant's identity by providing a copy of the tape would be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy which is not outweighed by the public's right to governmental information." In addition, we held that the tapes were exempt under KRS 61.878(1)(i), relating to correspondence with private individuals, because they consist of oral allegations which initiate an investigation and can therefore be likened to a written complaint. We do not believe that that opinion is dispositive of the present appeal.
OAG 90-117 predates the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Kentucky Board of Examiners of Psychologists v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co. After Board of Examiners, there can be no doubt that a policy of blanket exclusion of records, or entries on records,on the basis of KRS 61.878(1)(a) is generally impermissible. The public agency bears the burden of proving the exempt status of the records or entries by establishing, with reference to each record or entry, that the public's interest in disclosure is outweighed by the individual's privacy interests.
Moreover, as Mr. Fleischaker correctly notes, the release of a dispatch log cannot be equated with the release of an audio tape of "911" calls. As noted, individuals may utilize the service without identifying themselves, or they may
request that their identities remain confidential, and their identities will be protected.
Additionally, we are not persuaded that KRS 61.878(1)(i)4 authorizes nondisclosure of names and identifying information appearing on the log. We concur with Mr. Fleischaker in the view that that provision does not extend to complaints or communications made by telephone, but is limited to "correspondence" as that term is commonly understood. Consistent with the rule of statutory construction codified at KRS 446.080(4) that "words and phrases shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of language . . . ," we believe that the term "correspondence" in KRS 61.878(1)(i) means "communication by exchange of letters," or "the letters exchange." Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary (1988). The term cannot be construed to apply to oral complaints or communications recorded on an audio tape or to written notations appearing on a dispatch log which memorialize those complaints or communications. To the extent that OAG 90-117 is inconsistent with this view, it is hereby overruled.
With these principles in mind, we consider the types of calls received by the Nelson County Dispatch Center as identified in Mr. Seay's response to Mr. Lowery's request. Mr. Seay argues that KRS 61.878(1)(a) and (i) authorize the nondisclosure of the names and identifying information of persons calling "911" and persons against whom allegations or complaints are made. It is the opinion of this Office that the Nelson County Dispatch Center may not adopt a policy of blanket exclusion relative to these entries on the dispatch log, but must "articulate" its reasons for withholding a particular entry. OAG 89-20, p. 3. We believe that this rule applies with equal force to "regular" or "nonemergency" calls, such as complaints about loud music or barking dogs. The Center may properly withhold particular entries arising from these calls only if it can justify its refusal to permit inspection with
4KRS 61.878(1)(i) exempts from the mandatory disclosure provisions of the Open Records Law:
Preliminary drafts, notes, correspondence with private individuals other than correspondence which is intended to give notice of final action of a public agency.
specificity. The same is certainly true of miscellaneous radio communications between the Dispatch Center and law enforcement personnel in the field. In OAG 89-20, this Office held that police radio transmission logs are generally subject to inspection. In the absence of a particularized showing that a given notation was properly withheld, the Center cannot exclude log entries of communications with law enforcement personnel in the field.
This Office has taken a somewhat more restrictive view with respect to fire runs. In OAG 92-75, we held that a public agency must release general information on the number of runs made by an ambulance service, the destination of the runs, whether an individual or individuals were transported to a hospital or treatment facility, and if so where they were taken. We expressed concern for the privacy interests of individuals who avail themselves of the services provided by an ambulance district. In an earlier opinion, we held that a fire run could be likened to an ambulance run. Insofar as fires frequently involve human tragedy, we concluded that personal information appearing in such reports should be treated in the same manner as personal information contained in ambulance run reports. OAG 86-25.
We depart from that view today. While we continue to believe that the privacy interests of persons who avail themselves of fire services are substantial and that the custodian should bear this in mind in determining whether particular entries may be withheld, we believe that a policy of blanket exclusion relative to the names and identifying information of persons requesting fire service is inconsistent with the Open Records Law. To be exempt from inspection, particulars regarding given notations on the log must be "articulated in terms of the requirement of the statute." OAG 89-20, at p. 3. To the extent that OAG 86-25, and authorities cited therein, are inconsistent with this position, they are modified accordingly.
In sum, we find that although the Nelson County Dispatch Center appears to have set forth, in good faith, a statutorily based denial of a request for public records, and to that extent, complied with the Open Records Law, its policy relative to particular entries on its dispatch log is inconsistent with the law. For the reasons set forth above, we believe that the dispatch log must be made available. The Dispatch Center may comply with the inspection requirements of the Open Records Law by providing an unedited copy of the log,
or, if particular entries are properly excludable, by providing particularized justification for its denial.
Mr. Fleischaker and the Nelson County Dispatch Center may challenge this decision by initiating action in the appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.880(5)(a) and 61.882. Although the Attorney General should be notified of any action in the circuit court, he may not be named as a party in that action, or in any subsequent proceedings.
AMYE B. MAJORS
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Hon. John David Seay
Assistant Nelson County Attorney
113 West Stephen Foster
Bardstown, Kentucky 40004
Hon. Jon L. Fleischaker
Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs
Attorneys at Law
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
Mr. Steve Lowery
The Kentucky Standard
110 W. Stephen Foster Avenue
Bardstown, Kentucky 40004